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Abstract
LGBT rights has become an increasingly important part of the EU’s founding values. 
Yet, large discrepancies exist within the Union regarding the protection of sexual 
minorities. Using the Europeanisation theories of external incentives and social 
learning, this paper seeks to assess what impact the European Union has on the 
implementation of LGBT rights during the accession process. By contrasting the 2004 
enlargement to the current accession of Croatia to the Union, it is examined whether the 
EU has learned from its previous experiences and altered its mechanisms. It is 
concluded that the EU has strengthened its accession mechanisms in a number of ways. 
It is however to soon to tell whether this will result in enduring post-accession 
compliance.
Keywords: EU, LGBT, accession process, social learning, Europeanisation, external 
incentives.
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11  Introduction
In the past 20 years, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights has become 
increasingly  important to the European Union (EU or hereinafter Union). Today, the 
norm of LGBT equality is firmly anchored in EU legislation, as well as part of the 
founding values of the Union. Yet, almost a decade after the EU’s expansion to the east, 
large discrepancies can be found between as well the EU and some Member States, as 
between the Member States themselves. Non-discrimination towards sexual minorities, 
a part of the acquis communitaire, has still not become fully  internalised in some 
Member States. The EU has considerable influence on its candidate states during the 
accession period, and the Copenhagen criteria puts strong pressure on the candidate 
states to adopt EU norms and rules. Still, after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, there 
appears to have been a backlash with regards to LGBT rights. 
 On 1 July, 2013, Croatia becomes the 28th member state of the European Union. 
Given the increased importance ascribed to LGBT rights since the last enlargement, has 
the EU made changes in its accession process, to better safeguard the norm of LGBT 
equality?
1.1 Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what can be done within the framework of the 
EU accession process, to promote the norm of LGBT equality  to candidate states. Expe-
riences from previous enlargements suggests that the EU has not succeeded in securing 
post-accession compliance to a culturally sensitive norm. More specifically, the thesis 
therefore aims at investigating whether the EU has learned from its previous experi-
ences and adapted its accession process. 
• Has the EU learned from its previous experiences and changed its 
methods in the accession process?
21.2 Method
I answer the question by first assessing the EU commitment to LGBT equality, and ar-
gue that there is a strong legal and political norm of LGBT rights, that is anchored both 
in the EU’s founding documents, as well as in the political culture. The norm is expres-
sed not only  within the Union, but also in its external relations. I then contrast this nor-
mative commitment to the situation for LGBT people in many  of EU’s eastern Member 
States, to establish that there is a discrepancy between EU policy  and practice. To assess 
what impact the EU may  have had on LGBT rights in the accession process, and whet-
her more could have been done to ensure post-accession compliance to the norm, I then 
analyse the 2004 enlargement round, using the Europeanisation theories of social learn-
ing and external incentives. Both are models that have been specifically  adapted for the 
EU Eastern enlargement. Finally, I look at the current accession process in Croatia, and 
compare it to the 2004 enlargement process. What has been done differently? Has the 
EU learned from its experiences?
 I take a constructivist approach to my study. Constructivists emphasizes the im-
portance of identities and norms. This reflects on my initial thesis that values and norms 
are important to the the EU identity, and that this identity in turn controls much of EU 
action. 
32  LGBT Rights in the EU
2.1 The Normative Foundation of the EU
Over the past 20 years, the EU has steadily moved from maintaining a nearly exclusive 
focus on economic matters to embracing human rights as part  of the supranational 
agenda. During these years, human rights has become a central component of the EU’s 
work, both within the Union and in its external relations.1 
 It has often been argued that the EU is first and foremost a peace project, and that 
the economic and political cooperation is to a large extent a mean to achieve the ulti-
mate goal of peace.2  Finding a common European identity that binds Europe together is 
thus of importance. Already in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), 
explicit reference is made to human rights:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons be-
longing to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail.
Human rights and minority rights, along with principles of non-discrimination and tol-
erance, are thus explicitly referred to as the founding values of the European Union. The 
importance attested to these values are further demonstrated by the provisions of Article 
7 of the TEU, according to which the Council, if they determine that there is a “serious 
breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2”, may decide to suspend 
certain of the rights of the Member State, including its voting rights in the Council. 
1 Karen E. Smith, 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
p. 12f
2 Birger Möller, 2005. Vad är EU - och vad kan det bli? Stockholm: Santérus, p. 11
4Even though such extreme measures are unlikely to happen, it  is a powerful testament to 
the importance the EU attests to human rights. 
 In 2000, the EU adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter brings 
together in a single document the fundamental rights protected in the EU, to make them 
more visible and to anchor them in EU law. The Charter is to ensure that EU Member 
States are protecting the fundamental rights when implementing EU law. Through Arti-
cle 6.1 of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, the Charter 
became legally binding in the EU, and has the same legal standing as the Treaties.3
 Human rights have also become increasingly  more visible in the EU external rela-
tions. Article 3.5 of the TEU states that “[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Un-
ion shall uphold and promote its values and interests”, and contribute to peace, security 
and the promotion of human rights.4  The EU can thus in many ways be regarded as a 
value-based community, with a distinct normative dimension. Its identity is largely 
based upon these “European” values of human rights.5
2.2 LGBT Rights in the EU
In this section I map out the EU legislation in the area of LGBT rights. A also argue, 
that in addition to the legislation, the EU has made a strong commitment to LGBT 
equality, something that is expressed through, inter alia, public declarations from EU 
officials and various policies.
2.2.1 Legislation
Up until the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty  in 1999, the EU had only made 
tentative attempts at discussing the issue of LGBT rights. The European Parliament had 
3 European Union, 2010. ”Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. (2010/C 83/02)
4 European Union, 2012. ”Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union”
5 Martijn Mos, 2013. ”Conflicted Normative Power Europe: The European Union and Sexual Minority 
Rights”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 81.
5during the 1980’s adopted two non-binding resolutions that highlighted the issue,6  but 
no policy proposals had been put forward. A major shift occurred with the so called 
Roth report in 1994,7  which has been described as a cornerstone in the Parliament’s 
work on LGBT rights. The Roth report brought up the issues of wide-spread sexual ori-
entation discrimination in the areas of employment, marriage, adoption, and privacy. 
The report  led the Parliament to call upon the Commission to draft   anti-discrimination 
recommendations for sexual orientation.8  The Parliament requested that such recom-
mendations should, at a minimum, seek to end different  and discriminatory  ages of con-
sent for homosexual and heterosexual acts, all forms of discrimination in labor law, the 
barring of gay and lesbian couples from marriage (or equivalent legal framework) and 
to have children. These developments coincided with an increased lobbying from vari-
ous minority groups, who called for stronger action from the EU Member States to 
eradicate discrimination on various grounds. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the Member 
States addressed the issue. Article 139  of the Treaty now allowed for the EU to adopt 
legislation banning all forms of discrimination, including sexual orientation.10  Up until 
this point, there was no legal protection at the EU level from discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation. Rather, two decisions from the Court  of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) (Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. and D. v. Council of the Euro-
pean Union) had demonstrated the need to protect the rights of LGBT people. Under 
current Community law, negative treatment of homosexuals did not constitute gender 
discrimination, as long as both male and female homosexuals were treated equally.11
 On the basis of these new treaty provisions, two landmark anti-discrimination Di-
rectives were shortly after adopted: the Race Equality  Directive (2000/43/EC) and the 
6 Resolution by Parliament on sexual discrimination at the workplace (Official Journal No C 104 
of 16 April 1984;  Resolution by Parliament on discrimination against transsexuals (Official Jour-
nal No. C 256 of 9 October 1989)
7 Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties & Internal Affairs on Equal Rights for Homosexuals 
& Lesbians in the European Community (EUR. PARL. DOC., A3-0028/94)
8 Resolution by Parliament on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC (Official Jour-
nal No. C 061 of 28 February 1994)
9 Now Article 19 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
10 Travis J. Langenkamp, 2003. ”Finding Fundamental Fairness: Protecting the Rights of Homosexuals 
Under European Union Accession Law”, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 4, p. 440f.
11 Ibid, p. 442f.
6Framework Employment Directive (2000/78/EC).12  The Framework Employment Di-
rective obliges Member States to adopt anti-discrimination legislation in the workplace 
on the grounds of disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief, and age. It is however 
much narrower in scope than the Race Equality  Directive, which prohibits discrimina-
tion in the areas of employment, education, social protection including social security 
and healthcare, and access to and the supply of goods and services, including housing. 
This effectively  means that there is no EU legislation protecting LGBT people from dis-
crimination such as impossibility to visit partners in hospitals, paying higher premiums 
on health insurance, being denied social benefits reserved for married couples, or being 
refused to rent, to name a few.13
 When the Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding it further em-
phasized the norm of non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, as Article 
21.1 of the Charter states that:
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief,  political or any other opinion, membership of 
a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited.14
The Lisbon Treaty also put the entry into force of the Treaty  on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Beyond obliging the EU to ensure that all EU legislation con-
forms with the Charter, the TFEU puts an obligation on the EU to actively mainstream 
equality in its work and activities.15
2.2.2 A Political Commitment
12 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal tre-
atment in employment and occupation.
13 Piotr Bakowski, 2010. ”The European Union and rights of LGBT people”. Library Briefing, 
100048REV2. Library of the European Parliament, p. 2f
14 European Union, 2010.
15 European Parliament, 2009a. ”Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union 
2004-2008”. (2007/2145(INI)), p.13
7Although the current legislation is not comprehensive in its scope, the EU thus have 
some competence to act  on LGBT issues. Beyond the anti-discrimination legislation, I 
argue that there is also a clear political norm on LGBT rights in the EU. This norm ex-
presses itself, inter alia, through the open support from EU officials and institutions. 
The European Parliament has become the principal driving force in bringing the issues 
of LGBT equality onto the EU political agenda. Although the Parliament is arguably the 
weakest among the major EU institutions in terms of political power, it plays a signifi-
cant role in influencing legislation by drafting amendments to Commission proposals, 
and in raising awareness of different issues. Each year the Parliament drafts and adopts 
a significant number of resolutions and reports. These resolutions are non-binding, but 
they  serve as important tools in the EU’s political context.16  Examples of resolutions 
and reports from the Parliament includes support for mutual recognition of same-sex 
partnerships between EU Member States, a call for a comprehensive anti-discrimination 
Directive, and a call for the revision of a homophobic law in Lithuania.17  
 Leading EU officials, such as Viviane Reding, Commissioner for Justice, Funda-
mental Rights and Citizenship, has on several occasions voiced their support for LGBT 
rights. In an op-ed piece, Reding testified to the Commission’s devotion to the issue 
when stressing “the importance of pursuing a determined effort in fighting against  ho-
mophobia and in promoting equality  for LGBT people”, because homophobia is an “un-
acceptable violation of human dignity”  and is incompatible with the founding values of 
the EU18.
 The EU commitment to LGBT rights can also be discerned in its external policies. 
Protecting and promoting the rights of LGBT people is now one of the EU’s priorities in 
its foreign policy. Through the “European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights” (EIDHR), adopted in 2007, the EU channels financial and organizational sup-
port to local NGO’s, and promotes, inter alia, non-discrimination on grounds of sexual 
16 ILGA-Europe, 2013a. ”What has the European Parliament done for LGBT rights?”
17 European Parliament, 2009b. ” European Parliament resolution of 17 September 2009 on the Lithua-
nian Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effects of Public Information”.
18 Viviane Reding, 2010. ”Homophobia must be stamped out across Europe, east as well as west”, EU 
Observer, 17 July 2010.
8orientation.19  In 2010, a “LGBT Toolkit” was adopted by the Council’s working party 
on human rights. The toolkit aims to “help the EU institutions, EU Member State capi-
tals, EU Delegations, Representations and Embassies to react proactively to violations 
of the human rights of LGBT people, and to address structural causes behind these vio-
lations”. This is to be done by outlining operational tools for raising issues of persecu-
tion, discrimination and ill-treatment of LGBT people in dialogues with third country 
representatives.20  Even though the toolkit is not legally binding for the Member States, 
it draws it  legitimacy from the TEU, and illustrates the EU’s commitment to LGBT 
equality. It  explicitly states that the EU will work actively to ensure that LGBT people 
can enjoy  their human rights, and seeks to facilitate for the Member States to address 
the human rights of LGBT people in their external relations.
 In addition to this, High Representative Catherine Ashton, as well as other high-
ranking EU diplomats, are frequently speaking out on issues of LGBT rights in third 
countries: 
The EU campaigns tirelessly for the respect of human rights, irrespective of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity. We raise the issue of LGBTI rights during our Human Rights dia-
logues, we speak out through public statements, and we work behind the scenes with our 
Delegations to argue the case for justice and human rights.21
In this section I have argued that there is a clear EU norm of LGBT equality. This norm 
is expressed not only in EU law, but also as a political norm, through statements and 
proposals from EU officials and institutions. In these statements, LGBT rights are often 
framed as being part of the EU’s fundamental values, such as non-discrimination, equal-
ity, and freedom of assembly.
2.3 Discrepancies Between the Member States
19 European External Action Service, 2013. ”Protecting and promoting the rights of LGBT people”.
20 Council of the European Union, 2010. ”Toolkit to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human 
Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) People”, p. 1,
21Catherine Ashton, 2013. ”Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the 
European Union on the occasion of the International Day Against Homophobia, 17 May 2013”
9We have thus far established that the EU has made a clear commitment to LGBT equal-
ity. Prior to the 2004 enlargement, there were concerns that the new Member States 
would not sustain the compliance with the EU acquis after accession, when the most 
powerful compliance mechanism - the promise of EU membership - was no longer pre-
sent. Even if these fears have proven to be overstated on most policy  areas,22  there are 
reasons for concern in the area of LGBT rights. As I will show in the following section, 
the human rights situation for LGBT people in the Member States are far from being 
equal. 
In a 2006 Eurobarometer survey, the discrepancy between old Member States and the 
new, eastern Member States is evident. On the issue of gay marriages, on average 44 % 
of EU citizens agreed that  gay marriages should be allowed throughout Europe. How-
ever, with the exceptions of the Czech Republic (52 %) and Slovenia (31 %), in none of 
the Member States from the 2004 enlargement that number exceeded 21 %.23
     The level of acceptance of gay marriages is, however, not an ideal indicator of ho-
mophobia. It is possible to imagine that one could be against gay marriage for religious 
reasons, without for that matter being of the opinion that LGBT people are not entitled 
to the same human rights as everyone else. Statistics from the World Values Surveys of 
1999 and 2005/2006 come closer to finding evidence of homophobia in the eastern 
Member States. In the survey 54,5 % of the respondents in Latvia, 55, 2 % in Poland, 
and 67,5 % in Lithuania responded that they  would not want a homosexual neighbour. 
The corresponding statistics for the EU-15 was 18,8 %, with the highest numbers being 
25-28 %. Even more astonishing are the replies to whether homosexuality is justifiable. 
76,9 % of the respondents in Latvia, 59,9 % in Poland, and 78 % in Lithuania consid-
ered homosexuality to never be justifiable. This is to be compared with the EU-15, 
where the average number was 23, with the highest numbers being 35-40 %.24  The 
World Values Survey thus echoes the findings of the Eurobarometer survey - that there 
are significant differences between old and new Member States, in the attitudes towards 
homosexuality.
22 Jonas Tallberg, et al., 2009. Europa efter utvidgningen. 1. uppl. Stockholm: SNS Förlag, p. 125
23 European Commission. 2006. ”Eurobarometer 66: First results”, p. 41.
24 World Values Survey, 2009. ”1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901”.  
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 In several eastern Member States, Pride Parades have been denied permission. 
Reasons given for the bans include participant and public safety, the violation of public 
morals, and the preservation of public order.25  This was the case in 2008 in Lithuania, 
and the year after in Latvia.26 In 2010, a local court suspended a permit given for a pride 
march in Vilnius. The march could later take place, but only after a ruling in the Su-
preme Administrative Court upheld the permission.27 Similar bans on pride parades has 
occurred in Poland, although the situation thee has improved significantly  in recent 
years, with the successful completion of “Europride” in 2010 as a prime example.28
 The European Parliament has acknowledged the surge in homophobia in the east-
ern Member States in a number of resolutions. In a resolution from May 2012, the Par-
liament strongly condemned “any  discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity”. It further regretted that “in the EU, the fundamental rights of LGBT 
people are not always fully upheld”.29  The resolution explicitly singled out Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Latvia for their deficits in the area of LGBT rights. In 2009, the Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution where they  declared that a Lithuanian law (the law of Protec-
tion of Minors against the Detrimental Effects of Public Information) was in breach of 
EU and international human rights obligations, and called for the revision of the law.30 
The law would, inter alia, forbid so called “propaganda” of homosexual relations to mi-
nors. 
	
 While the situation for LGBT rights has improved in some Member States in the 
past years, a recent study from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA), with more than 93 000 respondents from the EU Member States and Croatia, 
concludes that discrimination still takes places in all Member States of the Union. 
Nearly half of all respondents reported that they had felt personally discriminated 
against or harassed due to their sexual orientation in the last year. A quarter had experi-
25 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010. ”Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity - 2010 Update. Comparative Legal Analysis.”, p. 31.
26 Euobserver, 100507. ”Europe’s shame”.
27 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010, p. 33.
28 Ibid, p. 32.
29 European Parliament, 2012. ”European Parliament resolution on the fight against homophobia in Euro-
pe ( 2012/2657(RSP)”, para. 1.
30 European Parliament, 2009, para. 4.
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enced violence in the past five years. The study also confirms that there has been an in-
crease in homophobia in many eastern European states.31  In response to the question 
“how widespread is offensive language about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender 
people by politicians where you live?”, a distinct difference could be seen between east-
ern and western Member States, where in the western states, generally fewer than 10 % 
of the respondents answered “very widespread”, whereas in the eastern states, up to 30-
40 % of the respondents gave the same answer.32
2.4. LGBT Rights in Croatia
Currently, the European Union is in the concluding stage of its seventh enlargement. On 
1 July 2013, Croatia will become the 28th member of the Union. I will in the following 
section briefly outline the status of LGBT rights in Croatia. 
 The situation for LGBT rights in Croatia is similar to that in many of the eastern 
European Member States, prior to accession. Prior to the initiation of accession negotia-
tions, few legal protections for LGBT people existed. In 2003, Croatia passed an “Act 
on Homosexual Unions”, which gave same-sex unions the same legal recognition as 
non-marital partnerships between people of the opposite sex.33 It is however important 
to note that numerous rights from other laws are applied only to marital partners, and 
are thus not applicable to partners of same-sex unions34. Prohibitions of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation were also introduced into the Gender Equality Act, Criminal 
Code, Labour Act, and into schoolbook standards In 2006 a definition of hate crimes, 
which included sexual orientation, was introduced in the Criminal Code. In 2008, the 
Anti-Discrimination Act was passed by  the Croatian parliament. For the first time in 
Croatian legislation, a ban on discrimination on the basis of gender identity  was 
31 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013a. ”EU LGBT survey. European Union lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender survey. Results at a glance”,  p. 7,9
32 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013b. ”LGBT Survey Data Explorer”. 
33 European Commission, 2005. Croatia - 2005 Progress Report. SEC (2005) 1424, p. 89.
34 Sanja Juras, 2010. ”2010 Annual Report on the Status of Human Rights and Gender Minorities in Cro-
atia”, p. 23.
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introduced.35  However, as there are no specific guidelines for the police, physical at-
tacks on LGBT people were not always classified as hate crimes, and sometimes even 
treated a minor offences. In 2013, a new Criminal Code entered into force, which ac-
knowledged that hate crimes can be perpetrated on the additional basis of gender iden-
tity of the victim. Other improvements to the legal protection against homophobic hate 
crimes include the adoption of Rules of Procedure, and police training undertaken in 
cooperation with LGBT organisations.3637
 Similar to the situation in the eastern Member States, homophobic hate crimes and 
disruptions has occurred during Pride parades in Croatia. During the 2011 Pride parade 
in Split, a large number of counter-protesters disrupted the march by  shouting violent 
threats and throwing stones at the participants. The counter-demonstration had been an-
nounced several weeks ahead, and some members of the local clergy  had opposed the 
march, and even explicitly called on the congregations to protest against it. Still, the po-
lice did not provide adequate protection for the march, and counter-protesters could not 
be held at a safe distance from the march. 26 people were prosecuted for offences with a 
hate bias, and an additional 103 with minor offences perpetrated with a homophobic 
motive.38
 The general societal acceptance for homosexuality is relatively  low. Homophobic 
declarations of public persons continue to be frequent. Croatian LGBT NGO’s testify to 
the widespread use:
On 7 November 2010 when asked by a journalist ”Could a player play for the Croatian 
national team if he was openly gay?”, Mr Markovic [president of the Croatian Football 
Association] stated for Vecernju List: ”While I am president,  definitely not.” When further 
asked: ”Did you ever meet such a player in your career?” Mr Markovic replied: ”No, 
fortunately only healthy people play football.”39
 
35 Ibid, p 4f, 16.
36 Amnesty International, 2012, Inadequate Protection. Homophobic and Transphobic Hate Crimes in 
Croatia. EUR 64/001/2012, p. 3
37  Amnesty International, 2013, International Report 2013. The State of the World’s Human Rights. POL 
10/001/2013, p. 73.
38 Amnesty International, 2012, p. 5f.
39 Sanja Juras, 2010, p. 52.
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Unfortunately, similar remarks are not uncommon, even among politicians:
On 13 July 2010 an interview was published in Vecernji List with a member of Parliament 
from the Croatian Peasants Party,  Mrs Marijana Petir. Among other things, the article 
stated: ”But she is not happy with the educational programme either. ’I remember that on 1 
December 2008 a programme for children was broadcast in the morning which propagated 
homosexual behaviour”, said Petir, disgusted.40
 
It should be noted that  positive developments has taken place as well. The 2001 Zagreb 
Pride parade, held only a week after the Split march, attracted more than 4000 partici-
pants, and a large number encouraging bystanders, and was able to proceed without vio-
lence and disruptions. was encouraged by supportive bystanders.  In May 2013, Croa-
tia’s first  same-sex marriage march took place, with over 400 participants. The govern-
ment has also announced plans to boost gay  couples’ rights, albeit without providing 
much details.41
40 Ibid, p. 52f.
41 ILGA-Europe, 2013, ”Croatia holds first same-sex marriage march”.
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3   Theoretical Framework
3.1 Previous Research
This study positions itself within the field of Europeanisation research, more specifi-
cally the Europeanisation of new member and candidate states of the European Union. 
One of the main critiques against Europeanisation as a research agenda is that research-
ers often use the term without  giving it a precise definition. As Kevin Featherstone 
notes, “the faddish use of ‘Europeanisation’ in different contexts can easily obscure its 
substantive meaning”42. However, he argues, “precisely the breadth of application and 
the demanding explanatory  framework needed, attests to the value and importance of 
the term”.43  The term provides a gateway to understanding the complex web of devel-
opments that characterizes the politics of the EU today.
 In order to avoid the critique that the scope of Europeanisation is too wide to be 
used as a research agenda, it is important to specify  what is meant by  “Europeanisa-
tion”. Even though the term can have a wider usage than just  issues concerning the EU, 
(such as increasing transnationalism, where ideas and norms spread across Europe), the 
term is today most associated with domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating di-
rectly or indirectly from EU membership.4445  
     One commonly used definition of the term is that of Claudio Radaelli. He states that 
Europeanization refers to: 
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and infor-
mal rules,  procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs 
42 Kevin Featherstone, 2003. ”Introduction: In the name of ‘Europe’” in Featherstone, Kevin & Claudio 
M. Radaelli (eds.). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3
43 Kevin Featherstone, 2003, p. 19.
44 Ibid, p. 7f.
45 Claudio M. Radaelli, 2003. ”The Europeanization of Public Policy” in Featherstone, Kevin & Claudio 
M. Radaelli (eds.). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 27
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and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then in-
corporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, 
and public policies.46
In other words, actors redefine their their interests and behavior to meet the imperatives, 
norms, and logic of EU membership.
On Norms and Norm Diffusion
Before going into the specifics of the norm diffusion process, a brief conceptualization 
of what I mean by “norms” are in order. In the social constructivist literature, definitions 
of norms are often based on behavior, prescription, and shared expectations. Norms rep-
resent standards of behavior that often result from common practices, but  who also have 
proscriptive or prescriptive qualities: they deem what is considered appropriate.47  It is 
this prescriptive quality that sets norms apart from ”rules”.
 In the norm diffusion process, two separate logics of action can be discerned to 
explain the reason behind actors’ behavior.  Actions can be seen as driven by a logic of 
consequence, where the anticipated consequences of the action and the prior preferences 
of the actor determines actor behavior. The actor thus makes a rational calculation of 
what consequence a certain action will result in.48  Within the logic of appropriateness, 
on the other hand, actions are seen as rule-based. As March and Olsen explains, “[t]he 
pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the 
selection of rules more than with rational expectations”.49  Thus, in the present case, if a 
state, or state actor, is driven by  a logic of appropriateness, it adheres to a norm because 
it is convinced of the merits of the norm. In contrast, if it  is driven by a logic of conse-
quence, it adheres to the norm because it believes that there is something to be gained 
from doing so, and not necessarily because it believes in the merits of the norm.
46 Claudio M. Radaelli, 2003, p. 37
47 Annika Björkdahl, 2002. From Idea to Norm: Promoting Conflict Prevention. Diss. Lund: Dept. of 
Political Science, Univ., p. 40.
48 James March & Johan Olsen, 1998. ”The institutional dynamics of international political orders”, In-
ternational Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 950.
49 Ibid, p. 951.
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 The two logics places themselves under different theoretical approaches: the so-
ciological institutionalist versus the rationalist institutionalist.50  However, as both 
Featherstone and March & Olsen points out, the two logics are not incompatible. 
Rather, as we shall see, the two logics often occur simultaneously or  they characterize 
different phases of the Europeanisation process. The impact of Europeanisation is also 
differential across policies, polities, and politics, which is why different explanations for 
action and different basis for institutional change may be required.5152
 In their work on international norm dynamics, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink argue that norms evolve in a certain pattern they describe as the norm’s “life 
cycle”.53 The “life cycle” consists of three stages - norm emergence, norm cascade and 
internalisation. This study concentrates on the second stage in the norm life cycle, the 
norm cascade. In this stage, norm leaders attempt to socialise other states to become 
norm followers.54  When a critical mass of relevant state actors has adopted a norm, the 
norm has reached its “tipping point”, and will thereafter become internalised - “taken 
for granted”. 
Socialisation
In his work on the socializing potential of international institutions, Jeffrey Checkel de-
fines socialisation as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalisation of these 
new norms”.55  During the socialisation process, the actor switches from following a 
logic of consequences, to a logic of appropriateness. However, Checkel argues, agents 
may follow a logic of appropriateness in more than one way. Agents may, for example, 
simply  act  in accordance with what is expected of them by others. They  adopt a role, 
regardless if they agree with the role or not. “The key is the agents knowing what is so-
50 Kevin Featherstone, 2003, p. 15f.
51 Ibid, p. 16
52 James March & Johan Olsen, 1998, p. 953f.
53 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. ”International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 888.
54 Ibid, p. 895.
55 Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2005. ”International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework”, International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4, p. 804.
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cially  accepted in a given setting or community”.56  But the interests and values of the 
agent may also change, resulting in another type of internalisation.  Community norms 
are then accepted as “the right thing to do”, and the values and sometimes also the iden-
tity of the community are adopted by the agent. 57
 To summarize, socialisation is a process, with the end goal of internalisation. This 
process can occur through different mechanisms. Two examples of such mechanisms 
are external incentives and social learning. External incentives theory and social learn-
ing are not the only  models of norm diffusion and Europeanisation, but  they are models 
who have been explicitly adapted to the Eastern enlargement, particularly  regarding lib-
eral democratic norms, and are therefore suitable for this analysis.58 
3.2 External Incentives Theory
One of the major approaches in the field of EU enlargement studies regarding the Cen-
tral and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ adaption into the EU norms and rules is the 
“external incentives model”. In this model, it is argued that the rule adaption of the CEE 
candidate countries was mainly driven by the reward of EU membership, promised by 
the EU as an external actor.59 As adopting norms are politically  and economically costly 
for states, external incentives, such as EU conditionality, has been considered the most 
effective mechanism. 60
 Frank Schimmelfennig, one of the major scholars on Europeanisation in the CEE 
countries, argues that  “only the credible conditional promise of membership in the EU 
(and NATO) has the potential to produce compliance with liberal-democratic norms in 
56 Ibid, p. 804.
57 Ibid, p. 804.
58 Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier, 2005. ”Conclusions: The Impact of the EU on the Acces-
sion Countries” in Schimmelfennig, Frank & Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), 2005. The europeanization of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 230.
59 Gerda Falkner & Oliver Treib, 2008. ”Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to 
New Member States”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 294.
60 Conor O’Dwyer, 2010. ”From Conditionality to Persuasion? Europeanization and the Rights of Sexual 
Minorities in Post-Accession Poland”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 229.
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norm-violating transformation countries”.61  Schimmelfennig argues that the democracy 
promotion by European regional organisations has been effective in producing durable 
democratic change. Political conditionality  is used by international organisations to in-
duce political change at  the state level. In the CEE countries, the adoption of liberal-
democratic norms became the condition for attaining EU membership. The EU has em-
ployed political conditionality  based on rewards. Candidate states has not been coerced 
into adapting their political systems according to the EU demands, but the reward of EU 
membership has been withheld if the states have not complied.62 
 According to the external incentives theory, the adoption of EU norms of democ-
racy  and human rights depends on “the size and credibility  of tangible, material incen-
tives provided by external actors as well as on the political costs that target  governments 
occur when adopting and implementing these rules domestically”.63  The size of the re-
ward must be bigger than the domestic costs of imposing the norm, and the target gov-
ernment must be certain that the reward will be paid if the conditions are met. 
 If EU membership  is the single most important factor in candidate state compli-
ance of EU norms, one would expect  compliance to weaken after EU membership  is 
obtained, as there is thus no longer any strong external incentives for compliance.  Then 
how can external incentives be perceived as being a method for true democratic con-
solidation? According to social constructivist  theories, the rationale behind using condi-
tionality for imposing certain rules and norms on states lies in the perception that “legal 
rules and norms operate by  changing interests and thus reshaping the purposes for 
which power is exercised”.64  Norms and rules shape and constrain states in their 
decision-making, by obliging them to observe the norms. By taking part in the process 
of norm-creation, state actors begin to think that complying with the norm is in their 
own self-interest. There has been a gradual shift  from a logic of consequences to a logic 
61 Frank Schimmelfennig, 2007. ”European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Demo-
cratic Transformation in Eastern Europe”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 126.
62 Ibid, p. 127
63 Arista Maria Cirtautas & Frank Schimmelfennig, 2010. ”Europeanization Before and After Accession: 
Conditionality, Legacies, and Compliance”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62, No. 3, p. 424.
64 Pamela Jordan, 2003. ”Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe 
and Compliance with Human Rights Norms”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 664.
19
of appropriateness. What starts as a so called instrumental adoption of a norm, when 
states choose to conform to a certain norm if they believe that it will facilitate coopera-
tion and minimize transaction costs, may lead to a process of identity transformation. A 
state may choose to conform to inter alia a human rights norm because it believes that it 
will gain advantages in forms of inter alia international prestige or improved trade con-
ditions. But if this adoption of the norm leads to a domestic structural change (such as 
increased democratization), this spills over into a process of identity transformation. 
Thus, norms that are initially adopted for instrumental reasons, are later maintained be-
cause they have become a part of the state's belief and identity. 65  In other words, after 
“imposing” the norms through conditionality, the states begin to act in accordance of the 
norm because it has become part of their self-identity. One of the main concerns in the 
period around the 2005 EU enlargement was that the norm compliance of the new 
members would decrease after membership  was obtained.66 However, the high-intensity 
involvement of the Commission during the accession process was believed to create a 
momentum, where the states themselves would want to follow the EU norms even after 
becoming members, i.e. when the external incentive was no longer present.67
3.3 Social Learning
Unlike the external incentives theory, which proscribes that states choose to proscribe to 
a norm in order to reap a reward, the theories of social learning argues that durable con-
formity to a norm occurs when states are persuaded by the appropriateness of the norm. 
Europeanisation thus follows when a member or candidate state are convinced of the 
suitability of the EU norms, and the beliefs and preferences of domestic actors thereby 
are altered.68 This persuasion of the suitability of a norm is often the result of the activ-
ity  of transnational networks of actors, and international organisations, who puts pres-
65 Ibid, p. 664ff.
66 Conor O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 229.
67 Gwendolyn Sasse, 2008. ”The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection During 
and Beyond EU Accession”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 6, p. 842.
68 Conor O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 230, 232.
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sure on domestic governments to endorse European norms in the domestic political dis-
course. Such persuasion is easiest where the EU norms “resonate” with domestic norms, 
i.e. when the new norm is not  in direct  opposition to previous, dominant norms.69 Given 
the controversy surrounding issues of LGBT rights in many  Member States, social 
learning should be expected to be harder in this policy area than in many others. 
 This mechanism, just as the name implies, emphasizes learning. States are ex-
pected to be open to updating and altering their practices and believes in the light of 
new information. There is thus a focus on deliberative processes, where agents are open 
to be persuaded by  “the better argument”. By  developing and supporting transnational 
networks that include domestic, as well as European actors, the EU can foster social 
learning. This would also have the benefit  of increasing the perception of “norm owner-
ship”, that the norm is not considered as imposed and foreign. Further, these networks 
can be used to channel financial support.70  Organized domestic advocacy networks are 
necessary  to represent the issue and lobby the national governments. Social learning 
will then occur as governments are being presented with arguments and beginning to 
accept them. The EU institutions can assist in supporting these advocacy networks, not 
least financially. It may be hard to determine whether social learning is taking place, but 
indications of social learning is when transformative public deliberations are taking 
place on the issue. In the case of LGBT rights, social learning is believed to occur when 
LGBT rights become a salient political issue, on which political parties differentiate 
themselves: “[i]f an issue is not salient in party competition, it constitutes part of the 
assumed status quo, or the ‘regime of silence’”.71
 During the accession process, there has been an emphasis on external incentives, 
such as conditionality. Even if this strategy has overall been successful in getting candi-
date states to internalise EU norms, as actors gradually start to identify themselves with 
their behavior, there is a risk that the norm is not fully internalised. If actors are not 
fully  convinced of the appropriateness of the norm, the norm may not be adhered to in 
the absence of the external incentives. This is particularly a risk in culturally  sensitives 
69 Conor O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 232f; Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2005, p. 813.
70 Conor O’Dwyer, 2010, p. 233.
71 Ibid: 233f.
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issues, such as LGBT rights. In my analysis of the two enlargements, I will examine 
whether the EU has increased its social learning mechanisms to promote LGBT rights in 
the accession process.
22
4  LGBT Rights During the 2004  
Enlargement
The discrepancy between the EU legal and political norms on LGBT equality  and the 
reality  in some of the “new” Member States implies that the EU accession might not be 
as efficient in securing compliance to the norms as one could have wished. The question 
thus arises: how was LGBT issues handled in the previous enlargement of 2004? 
 In the following chapter, I will evaluate how LGBT rights was handled in the 
previous enlargement. The examples used here is Poland and Latvia, but as we saw in 
section 2.3, the weak resonance of the norm of LGBT equality  is evident in several 
other new Member States.
As been discussed in section 3.1, scant scholarly  attention has been given to LGBT is-
sues in the Europeanisation literature. Two scholars that has addressed the issue is 
Conor O’Dwyer and Katarina Schwartz. In their study on antigay politics in post-
accession Poland and Latvia, they find that equal rights for sexual minorities have 
proved controversial in Poland and Latvia, much like the rights of ethnic minorities 
have been in a number of new Member States. But in the LGBT case, they  argue, the 
EU failed in spreading the norm of non-discrimination. 
The authors provide three findings that support  their argument that the norm has not 
been internalised. Firstly, the failure of institutional protection for minorities. Through 
the obstruction of Pride marches, and discriminatory legislation, as well as a clear un-
willingness to uphold LGBT rights, LGBT people are excluded from public life.72  Sec-
ondly, the inclusion of illiberal elites in “legitimate politics”. In both Poland and Latvia, 
during the first years after accession, the parties with stridently antigay rhetorics and 
72 Conor O’Dwyer & Katarina Z.S. Schwartz, 2010, ”Minority rights after EU enlargement: A compari-
son of antigay politics in Poland and Latvia”, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 8, p. 224ff.
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politics took place in government, proposing antigay legislation. 73And thirdly, the ag-
gressive rhetoric by political elites in the public sphere, often equating homosexuality 
with criminality, mental illness, pedophilia, and necrophilia, illustrates how dramatically 
Poland and Latvia deviate from core EU norms.74 
 The authors argue that this backlash of LGBT rights in the two countries was the 
result of a combination of factors. First of all, the EU employed weak conditionality af-
ter the accession. Just as the external incentives model would predict, neither Polish, nor 
Latvian politicians voiced antigay rhetorics before the EU membership was secured. 
After membership was accomplished, however, the EU had lost its most powerful in-
centive. Before accession, candidate state compliance was monitored rigorously  by the 
Commission, which produced regular Progress Reports on the states’ compliance to the 
Copenhagen Criteria. After accession, the Commission can initiate infringement proce-
dures if a Member State is not complying with EU law, but this is a case-by-case ap-
proach, and is only initiated after the Commission has been alerted to the problem. 
Thus, the monitoring of Member States is much weaker than that of candidate states. 
With decreasing monitoring capabilities, the credibility  of the norm becomes more im-
portant. The variation in treatment of sexual minorities among the old Member States, 
did not give sufficient credibility to the norm. Further, the EU itself did not put enough 
emphasis on the issue. 75  With regards to the criteria of minority protection, the Com-
mission put much greater emphasis on ethnic nondiscrimination. For a long time, the 
Commission only  mentioned the area of LGBT rights very briefly  in their Progress Re-
ports. There was no comprehensive and co-ordinated strategies for implementing the 
issue of LGBT rights in the accession negotiations, making the issue disconnected from 
the general provisions of the Copenhagen political criteria. Rather, it was the European 
Parliament who was moving the issue forward, in repeatedly calling attention to the is-
sue, and calling on candidate states to repeal discriminatory  provisions and practices.76 
73 Ibid, p. 229.
74 Ibid, p. 230.
75 Ibid, p 233ff.
76 Joke Swiebel, 2002. ”Gay and Lesbian Rights and EU Enlargement”, Open Society Institute - EU Mo-
nitoring and Advocacy Program, p. 1.
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ILGA-Europe, the leading LGBT advocacy  NGO in Europe, concluded in a 2001 report 
that:
[T]here is little will on the part of existing EU-members states and institutions to make the 
treatment of LGBT persons an integral part of the enlargement process. (…) It is difficult 
for the European Union to put real pressure on the applicant states to improve their treat-
ment of LGBT persons when the legal situation in some of the existing Member States 
[such as Austria, Greece, and the UK] is comparable,  if not worse, to that in some of the 
applicant states.77 
 
The shortcomings of the external incentives could have been compensated for by active 
persuasion from the EU’s side, on the legitimacy of the norm. But little such persuasion 
took place, the O’Dwyer and Schwartz argue. Compared to the field of environmental 
policy, where social learning had been an integral part of the EU’s strategy, both before 
and during the accession period, the EU did not foster networking among experts or 
policymakers. International cooperation, such as “The Environment for Europe” initia-
tive, had provided a platform that fostered deliberation, information exchange, and 
technical assistance, which all contributed to internalizing the EU norm.78
 Another factor that aggravated the internalisation of the norm was the fact that the 
norm of LGBT equality had very little resonance in both Poland and Latvia, for reasons 
of religious and national heritage. In the Polish case, the authors claim that the Commis-
sion was unwilling to agitate the Catholic Church, whose support was needed for 
strengthening the public opinion of the EU.79
 The failure to get Poland and Latvia to adopt the EU norms of LGBT quality  can 
thus be seen as a combination of weak external incentives, combined with lacking de-
liberative mechanisms to foster social learning. To avoid repeating the same mistakes in 
the Croatian accession, the EU should thus have developed its mechanisms for persua-
sion, in order for the norm to be successfully internalised. 
77 Mark Bell, 2001. ”The European Union - A new source of rights for citizens in the accession countri-
es?” in Jackie Lewis et al. (eds), ILGA-Europe, Equality for Lesbians and gay Men. A Relevant Issue in 
the EU Accession Process. Brussels: ILGA-Europe, p. 88f.
78 Conor O’Dwyer & Katarina Z.S. Schwartz, 2010, p. 235f.
79 Ibid, p. 236ff.
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 Does the post-accession development in Poland and Latvia have predictive power 
for the current accession process in Croatia? There are considerable similarities between 
Croatia and Poland, which should qualify Poland as a reference point to the socialisa-
tion of sexual minority  norms. They are both post-communist states, with a conservative 
history, and large societal influence from the catholic church. In the following chapter, i 
will examine the current accession process, to determine whether the EU has learned 
from previous experiences and adapted its accession mechanisms. 
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5  LGBT Rights in the 2013 
Enlargement 
We have seen that in Croatia, like in pre-accession Poland, there has not been a political 
and societal consensus on the norm of LGBT equality. How has the EU dealt with the 
issue of LGBT equality in Croatia’s accession process? Has there been any changes in 
the accession process compared to the previous enlargements? Is a backlash similar to 
the ones in Poland and Latvia to be expected after Croatia’s accession to the European 
Union? 
5.1 The Anti-Discrimination Directive
Since the previous enlargement, some major changes has been made to the EU 
accession machinery. Firstly, the Anti-Discrimination Directive (2000/78/EC) entered 
into force in 2000. It was thus already a part of the EU acquis communitaire at the time 
Croatia started accession negotiations in 2003. During the previous enlargements, the 
Directive entered into force in the late stages of accession negotiations. There was thus 
little room for deliberation on how to implement the Directive into the national 
legislation, and even less room for deliberating on the merits of the Directive and how it 
corresponds to the EU core norms. With the Directive in force, non-discrimination 
towards sexual minorities became closely tied to the fundamental values of the EU, and 
not merely a part of a (very large) acquis. 
 The central part of the Directive in the EU acquis, led to LGBT rights having a 
more prominent position in the negotiations. Already  in the early stages of negotiations 
the issue was raised, and as Croatia knew that they had to implement the full acquis, 
there was a clear and distinct credibility  to the expectation. Thus, both external 
incentives and social learning aspects were reinforced. 
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 The clear and unambiguous commitment to LGBT rights in the acquis, has also 
led to a higher degree of public debate on the issue in Croatia. As we could see in the 
previous sections, the issue of LGBT rights was largely absent from political debate in 
Poland and Latvia. The increased openness facilitates a deliberative process, and 
increases the likelihood of internalisation of the norm. 
5.2 The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Political 
Commitment
 Secondly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights has become legally binding before 
Croatia’s accession. Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is now 
anchored in a document with the same legal character as the Treaties, and Member 
States are obliged to ensure that the Charter’s provisions are respected when 
implementing EU law. Again, this make visible the issue of LGBT rights all through the 
negotiations, as it must be ensured that sexual minorities are not discriminated against 
during the transposition of the acquis into national legislation. 
 Thirdly, the strong political commitment the EU has placed on LGBT equality  
has, at least indirectly, affected also the enlargement process. According to the toolkit, 
all Member States’ representations, as well as EU Delegations, shall now promote the 
EU norms of LGBT equality in its relations with third countries. The impact on Croatia 
is seen in the fact that LGBT rights has now become one of Croatia’s priority  areas in its 
foreign policy  (towards multilateral organisations), in an attempt to adapt  to the EU 
norms and values.80
5.3 The Modified Mechanism
 Lastly, a new, modified pre-accession monitoring process has been introduced. To 
ensure that Croatia complies with all the accession requirements, the Accession Treaty 
included a formal pre-accession monitoring requirement. Croatia is the first candidate 
80 Vesna Pusic, 2012. ”Croatian Foreign Policy in the Context of European Union Membership”, Mediter-
ranian Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 2.
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state to have such a mechanism applied. The modified mechanism allows the 
Commission to continue to monitor Croatia in the last stage of the accession period. 
Before, once the accession negotiations was concluded, and up  until accession, the 
Commission did not produce any Progress Reports (as the requirements were 
considered to be fulfilled, otherwise negotiations would not  be closed). With the new 
mechanism, the Commission continue to monitor Croatia’s developments, and has the 
option to produce a Monitoring Report every  six months.81  Croatia completed the 
negotiations on June 30, 2011, and during this period, the Commission can follow up on 
Croatia’s fulfilment of the accession criterias. The Commission has released three 
Monitoring Reports, the latest on March 26, 2013.82 
 This provides the Commission with increased opportunities to monitor and to 
reprimand Croatia, and point out areas that need improvement before accession. 
Throughout the Monitoring Reports, the Commission has continued to stress the 
importance of LGBT rights.  In the report of October 2012, the Commission states:
With regard to human rights and the protection of minorities, human rights continue to be 
generally well respected, with attention still needed for the respect of lesbians, gays, 
bisexual and transgender people (LGBT) rights.  The gay pride events in Split and Zagreb 
took place without major incidents, with strong commitment of the Croatian government to 
their smooth organisation.83
In the report the Commission put forward ten priority actions, with commitments in the 
areas of competition, the judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and se-
curity. Croatia has completed them all. Critique against the new monitoring mechanisms 
has been that, although it is a positive contribution to the EU accession process, the 
mechanism and the related penalties are too vague.84
81 Nicole Wells, 2011, ”The Modified Mechanism in EU Accession: A Look at Croatia’s Accession to the 
EU and the plight of Croatia’s Roma Population”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 
597f. 
82 European Commission, 2013. ”Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Croatia - Acces-
sion treaty with Croatia.”
83 European Commission, 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliamnet and 
the Council on the Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s state of prepa-
redness for EU Membership (COM(2012) 601 final., p. 4.
84 Wells, Nicole, 2011, p. 583.
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5.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, there has been some significant changes in the EU’s accession mecha-
nisms. The EU now have a stronger commitment to LGBT rights, and more clearly de-
fined expectations on the candidate states. The Charter and the Anti-Discrimination Di-
rective have anchored LGBT rights more firmly in the EU acquis, and given them a 
more prominent place in the accession negotiations. 
	
 It is not yet possible to predict whether Croatia will experience a post-accession 
backlash regarding LGBT rights, as was the case in many of the former candidate states. 
Issues of LGBT rights are socially and culturally sensitive, and it will take time to 
change public perception on the matter. But there are indications of a political will from 
the ruling elite to address these issues, and important policy decisions have been made, 
inter alia in the foreign policy. 
	
 Only time will tell if the new pre-accession monitoring mechanism, along with the 
use of conditionality and social learning, was enough to secure post-accession compli-
ance to the EU rules and norms on LGBT equality, or if a backlash similar to the one 
that occurred in Poland is likely to happen.
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